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Abstract 
Starting from the problem of supply chain’s effectiveness dependency on good 
coordination of participants, this paper builds a theoretical and methodological tool for 
studying the quality of communication between parties in the process. The aim of the study, 
qualitative and explorative in its nature, was twofold. First, beer game simulation was used 
on students, to demonstrate the bullwhip effect, and to enable them learning from their own 
experience not only economical but also psychological effects of lack of cooperation. 
Second, there was an idea to analyze communication of parties in supply chain by 
observing interaction and interviewing participants and then categorizing their 
communication using a transactional analysis terminology as a system of classification. The 
hypothesis that transactional analysis can be used as a theoretical framework and 
methodological procedure for diagnosing and understanding social interactions was 
explored. As the study revealed some patterns, well described by transactional analysis 
concepts, psychological theory has a potential to improve understanding and practical 
realization of supply chain coordination and to provide some suggestions for overcoming 
communicational problems in supply chains of future managers.  
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Introduction 
As the supply chain consists of many different instances of participants, that have to 
function in coordination if they want to obtain their goals, their communication is of special 
interest for many scholars (Xu et al., 2001; Croson and Donohue, 2002; Yan Wu and 
Katok, 2006). Good coordination as the basis for effective business is dependent on mutual 
trust and commitment of every instance in this complex system or relations. So, good 
coordination can be achieved only through proper communication between each concerned 
party. The problem of good coordination becomes visible in those situations known as the 
bullwhip effect, when transmitting information through supply chain fails with the result of 
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diminishing profit of the whole chain. Bullwhip effect occurs when there is a lack of good 
chain coordination, so every stage distorts information, with different stages having a very 
different estimation of what it looks like (Chopra, 2001; Balan, 2008). Consequently, 
fluctuation in orders increases as they move up the supply chain. As every party only takes 
care of their objective and their local optimum, using and often misusing an amount of 
relative power they have, their actions end up hurting the performance of the entire supply 
chain. The main effect of this situation is profit loss, e.g. obtaining profit that is lower than 
what could be gained if parties took care of the whole supply chain optimum (Chopra, 
2001; Hosoda and Disney, 2006; Balan, 2008).  The bullwhip effect increases costs and 
jeopardizes the relationship among parties in the chain through their tendency to assign 
blame to each other as the consequence of the fact that each stage involved in the chain 
feels that they are doing the best they can with the losing the minimum trust between them. 
Therefore, it is obvious now that the major challenge, especially for managers, is to achieve 
coordination in spite of obstacles such as multiple interests (Chopra, 2001).  
Theory implies that we can provide adequate coordination predetermined by contracts 
(Tsay et al., 1999;  Poppo et al., 2002; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) but as there is a lot of 
uncertainty it is essential to develop a relationship between parties that allows mutual trust 
to compensate for all gaps in the contract (Coltman, et al., 2009). According to works of 
Disney et al. (2005, 2008) there are four coordination strategies, some of them more and 
some less functional in terms of bullwhip effect control. Good coordination is in building 
the trust and commitment based on the past experience of mutual consideration for the 
other party`s objective as if their own. It is a result of taking into account the total supply 
chain profit when making decisions rather than caring only for one`s own interest. The only 
way that each party can gain knowledge of the whole system interests is through sharing 
information which ensures supply chain visibility, so from our point of view, two important 
obstacles to coordination are those of information processing and those called behavioural 
obstacles (Chopra, 2001). Information processing obstacles are thoroughly elaborated 
referring to the situation in which demand is distorted as it moves between stages and leads 
to variability in orders (Wang et al., 2005; Hsiao and Shieh, 2006; Mishra et al., 2007). 
Behavioural obstacles are connected with personal characteristics.  
Operations management endeavours finding determinants of human conduction in a 
particular business situation and often uses experiments to confirm some of their 
assumptions (Croson and Donohue, 2002; Bendoly, et al., 2006). Principles of human 
behaviour have to be included in study bullwhip effect (Croson and Donohue, 2002; 
Nienhaus, et al., 2006). Ruel, et al. (2006), explore the association between personality 
traits and performance in supply chain tasks, recognizing that proneness to risk taking has 
an impact on order and inventory costs. Even psychological factors, as vague as 
impressions of other people are, could be of great importance when making decisions. Su, 
et al. (2008) formed SCRQ stands for supply chain’s relationship quality and implemented 
through the cooperative strategy. They found that SCRQ encompasses communication, 
cooperation, trust, adaptation and atmosphere and as such, has a positive effect on 
relationship persistence, frequency and diversity.  
There are also some indications that learning and getting an appropriate feedback could be 
of help in reducing bullwhip effect (Martin et al., 2004; Yan Wu and Katok, 2006). 
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Communication as a mechanism for information sharing that creates cooperation and 
enables trust to emerge, is also examined. Croson and Donohue (2002) evaluated the 
impact of point of sale data sharing on order fluctuation.  
Actually, relation between people can be based either on power or on trust, where in a 
power-based relationship the stronger party dictates its view (Chopra, 2001). It is usual that 
one party uses its power to obtain its local optimum and to increase its profit, not taking 
into account other participants in the business process. Nevertheless, there are many 
negative consequences of excessively exploiting power in business relations, especially 
when operating in the ever changing environment where balance of power can be changed 
overnight (Cox, 2001). Trust is a string that makes integration possible and real. Further, 
when one party systematically exploits its power advantage, others try to resist with the 
opportunistic behaviour and avoiding long term committing, trying to find other partners 
(Chopra, 2001). It seems that in a context of ever-changing business environment as the 
only invariable, partners have to build sustainable relationships based on trust as the key of 
effective and profitable supply chain.  
As it is obvious that all organizations and all business parties play games with the idea to 
maximize their profit, one could ask why some organizations succeed in their endeavours 
and others fail to be successful, especially in a sensitive problem situation when relations 
are complex in the supply chain (Dani, Backhouse, Burns, 2004). Here, we postulated that 
transactional analysis, as a psychological theory that based its concepts on analyzing the 
process of interaction with phenomenological approach to the matter, could serve us as a 
tool for understanding relations that occur within the supply chain. The potentials of this 
theory were proven in many cases and different areas of scientific interests. Relevant for 
this study are works of Dani, et al. (2003), who implemented concepts of games from 
transactional analysis to illustrate its potentials for generating distrust in organizational 
context and also in supply chain networks, where transactional analysis is seen as an 
information modelling tool (Dani, Backhouse, Burns, 2004).  
There are examples of using simulation as a method of teaching management students 
(Corsi, et al., 2006; Kumar, et al., 2007). Communication is recognized as the integral part 
of business partnership and an important factor in hindering unwanted consequences such 
as bullwhip effect (Croson and Donohue, 2002). Even the phenomenon of bullwhip effect 
is well known, whenever beer game simulation is used, the shocking and disappointing 
reactions of participants occur. They blame each other for the profit loss, they feel 
frustrated and hopeless (Sterman, 1992), not believing in the obvious consequences of their 
decisions. When facts show what we do not anticipate or would not like to recognize, we 
feel deceived and we often blame others for our mistakes or try to find the psychological 
reasons for this discrepancy between reality and expectations. Though personal causes are 
what often endangers appropriate communication, in this paper are explored the 
possibilities of one psychological theory based on analyzing human interaction, to give 
explanation and thorough understanding of supply chain functioning. The idea was to take 
transactional analysis (Berne, 1964) as the methodological tool for studying and theoretical 
framework for interpreting the qualitative difference between supply chains that have and 
those who fail to provide adequate coordination between its parties with the consequence of 
maximizing or diminishing overall profit.   
 Economic Interferences  AE 
 
Vol. XV • No. 33 • February 2013  213 
1. Explanatory potentials of transactional analysis 
Basic structural concepts of transactional analysis (TA) are ego states that are hypothetical 
constructs within a person. They represent the instances from which every individual could 
step into interaction with others. As theory proposes, we have three ego states: ego state of 
an Adult (A), of a Parent (P) and of a Child (C). Eric Berne (1964), creator of this theory 
postulated ego states as specific ways of thinking, feeling and behaving and they are fully 
experienced states (not just roles). They become visible, and thus approachable through 
personal behaviour, or, so called, transactions that are made from series of people`s 
interactions. Each transaction has two parts: stimulus and response. Transactions are “units 
of psychological exchange, i.e. communication between persons using certain (one) ego 
state” (Berger, 2000). Transactions are psychological, historical and behavioural facts 
specific for each person - personally specific filled with content that is person`s reality. To 
recognize an ego state, we use naturalistic approach, observing body posture, mimics, 
movements, eye contact (nonverbal language), the vocabulary that the person uses and the 
way that he speaks and the content of his message (Berger, 2000). It is important to define 
which ego state sends the message to what ego state of the other person and from which 
ego state the other person responds.   
Even Eric Berne, recognized the potentials of transactional analysis as the techniques 
applicable on organizational units. As Blackeney (1983) postulated, organizations are 
opened social systems and they could be seen as an instance of communication process. 
“A” ego state sends rational and objective messages, based on available data and it is 
occupied with their assessment in the context of reality (Berger, 2000). Therefore, it deals 
with solving everyday life problems. We can recognize that someone is speaking from the 
“A” ego state if he uses terms as if something is possible or practical. Many everyday 
transactions in business world are based on transactions involving two “A” ego states. In 
organizations, these messages are referred to as a technical culture (Dani, Backhouse, 
Burns, 2004). According to Berger (2000), "P" ego state contains messages coloured with 
moral statements, values, messages of approval (acclamation), acceptance, support, 
protection, permission, stimulation (if nurturing parent is in question) or messages of   
criticizing, directive, restraint, injunction, control and punishment (if Controlling Parent is 
active). They have in common that this position sends a note that something has to be done 
(should, must). This position can be recognized in the world of business communication 
through controlling and conduction of exercising power. Regardless of whether it is a 
positive patronizing position or a negative attitude, clear symbols of someone`s power are 
always present. "C" ego state could be defined by messages loaded with feelings and 
wishes, subjectively intonated, irrational but energizing. Business situation seen from this 
ego state is one of free, spontaneous exchange in terms of actual needs that can sometimes 
lead to the opportunistic and defiant behaviour, with explosive outbursts or to the state of 
obedience and servile posture. Although this state is characterized as self-centered and 
emotional, thus not mature, it is also powerful because of its energy (Berger, 2000). This 
energy could be a source of conflict in business situations.  
In every single exchange persons activate one of their ego states due to the fact that 
communication is coherent to their wishes. The one that initiates communication sends 
transactional stimulus that is to be responded to from the person to whom it was directed and 
it ends with the closure of one transaction. By analyzing this episode we come to the 
understanding of ego states and their changes. Transactions usually happen in series 
(sequences) and analysis teaches us that there is always certain regularity in their occurrence, 
so we could categorize them into some known patterns of communications. Transactions AE  Application of Transactional Analysis in Bullwhip Effect Analysis 
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could be simple, if they involve two ego states, or complex, when there are more ego states 
in question. Further, they can be complementary, involving one ego state in every person in 
a way that could make communication last infinitely. Communication between two persons 
continues as long as transactions are complementary (Berger, 2000; Solomon, 2003). If 
transactional response is addressed to an ego state different from the one which started the 
stimulus that disrupt communication, we call that transaction crossed and they are often 
triggers for conflicts (Solomon, 1983). We often avoid these transactions if there is an 
interest to continue collaboration. There are also covert transactions when people say one 
thing and mean another. They are deceptive, having a social (overt) and psychological 
(covert) level. From those transactions games arise (Berger, 2000). (Figure nor. 1). 
P: 
Values, moral judgements, 
messsages of acclamation, protection, 
permission, simulation, acceptance of 
criticizing, directive, restraint, 
injunction, control and punishment 
A: 
Rational and objective messages, 
based on available evaluated data, 
occupied with solving concrete 
problems 
A:
POSSIBLE / 
FUNCTIONAL, 
PRACTICAL 
P:
IT SHOULD OR MUST 
C:
TO WANT / TO FEEL 
C: 
Subjective, energizing but irrational, 
dependant on primary processes 
Complementary 
transactions 
Covert transactions
(angle and duplex) 
Crossed 
transactions  
Buyer  Supplier  
Figure no. 1: Ego states and transactions 
Source: Berger, 2000; Solomon, 2003 
As a game has a definite sequence of activity involving a pattern of transactions (it is a 
repeating pattern of transactions that occurs between supply chain partners, it is not hard to 
notice an analogy between games (defined by Berne) and business strategies that 
companies often have. Dani, et al. (2004) say that between organizations games are more 
conscious and planned actions corresponding to the unspoken transactions strategies. They 
also point out that organizations exploit games for politicking, disguising tensions, 
concealing conflicts of interests and providing opposition. Games are representing the 
social reality of the organization and they are not always on conscious levels but “they are 
designed to maintain power balance” (Dani, et al., 2004).  
 
2. Research problem  
Starting from the problem of diminishing profit when the bullwhip effect occurs, we use the 
beer game simulation for illustrating non effective supply chain. This model was created by 
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early sixties as a part of the industrial dynamics research conducted by Jay Forrester. It is 
used for the purposes of simulation of supply chain performances with the one participant 
in every phase of the supply process. Since goals of this study were twofold, simulation 
served as a tool for getting participants-students apprehension of bullwhip effect 
phenomenon through their own experience, and as an instrument for gaining insight into 
communication between them as elements of supply chain. The idea came from the widely 
used beer game simulation for educational purpose (Corsi, et al., 2006; Kumar, et al., 2007) 
and from different endeavors of the scientists to define, understand, explain and predict 
human factors that influence business decisions.  
Inspired by the case studies found in literature, especially of Dani, et al. (2004) we 
systematically followed the students` communication after the beer game simulation, with 
previously defined categories for classifying communicational units (transactions). We 
were lead by the statement that TA concepts are widely applicable (Berne, 1964), so, 
although it is conceived as a psychotherapy model and psycho-diagnostic tool, we tried to 
use it to get the bigger picture of critical moments of business communication in supply 
chain.  We wanted to prove with one representative example of interaction, that there is a 
great potential in analyzing communication according to TA principles for understanding 
bases of coordination in supply chains and preventing conflicts and eventually 
consequences of bullwhip effect. Through “diagnosing” business strategy, according to the 
analyses of transactions, and deconstructing prevailing business “games” by observing 
every sequence of exchange between partners and recognizing ego states they use, we came 
to our conclusions.  
The main idea of the simulation was to provide our students with the opportunity to 
experience real life problems when dealing with the supply chain situation. Our educational 
goal was focused on experiential method of acquiring knowledge (learning), with the 
scientific goal of analyzing specifics of their communication in terms of one 
psychologically well developed theory - transactional analysis.   
We started with the hypotheses that when studying a supply chain phenomenon, especially 
bullwhip effect:  
 It is of great importance to take into account the rules of human conduction 
 There are productive and counterproductive patterns of business behaviour and they 
are identifiable in communication processes  
 TA could be seen as a theoretical framework and methodological tool for studying 
supply chain interactions 
 
3. Procedure – beer game simulation 
We observe transactions using beer game, which simulates the performance of supply chain 
with one participant in every supply phase. Our participants were students of management, 
attending a course in industrial logistic and this was a method which enabled them to learn 
bullwhip effect from their own experience. There were two groups of students, with 8 
students in group. First group was familiar with the concept of bullwhip effect; they were 
previously informed of such a phenomenon while the other group was of “naive” 
participants with the lack of knowledge of such phenomenon. Students, in every group AE  Application of Transactional Analysis in Bullwhip Effect Analysis 
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were divided in two teams, each of them representing one supply chain. The goal for both 
teams was to minimize the costs of the whole chain, considering inventory and backorder 
costs. The winner was the one team that accomplished to have fewer costs. Teams were 
comprised of four sectors: Retailer, Supplier, Distributer and Manufacturer, with one 
student in every sector and lecturers were in the role of buyers.  
The retailer strived to satisfy the buyer`s demands from his own stock. Every unsatisfied 
order stayed for the next phase as a backorder. The retailer ordered from the wholesaler, 
who ordered from the distributer and distributer ordered from the manufacturer, who 
ordered from his supplier. The flow of ordered products went through the introduction 
phase and transportation phase, so, two iterations of simulation elapsed before the product 
went to another phase.  
Communication between participants was limited only to an amount of products the buyer 
ordered from the next supplier and the amount that he delivered him. Every participant had 
accurate local information (about the backorder, amount of products delivered by his direct 
supplier and the amount that he had just delivered to his buyer), but he did not have an 
insight to the global information.  
The game started from the state of equilibrium in which every player had 12 crates of  beer, 
and students were familiar with the fact that demanded quantity of beer from every player 
was constant for the first three weeks (4 crates) during which they did not have to make a 
decision about the quantity of order. At the beginning of the fourth week players could 
choose the order quantity, being informed that demand from the customer could vary. One 
of the tasks for each player was to make an order based on his prediction of the size of 
demand, not forgetting that the delivery time was two weeks. The game, developed on MIT 
outlast for 50 simulation weeks, but the well known effects arise much earlier. So, our 
simulation lasted for 23 simulation weeks. The buyer ordered an amount of approximately 
8 crates, but the retailer was the only one familiar with the actual size of demand.  
This simulation showed similar effects as in real supply chain (Lee, et al., 1997) and also in 
other simulation games where costs without insight in the whole chain were 2000 dollars, 
for the 50 weeks simulations, compared with only 200 in ideal case (MIT).   
 
4. Analysis of communication patterns  
After all iterations of beer game had completed, we started with the second part of our 
study. In the MIT simulation (Sterman, 1992) as in our previous simulations participants 
reported that feelings of frustration and anger. As we wanted to understand what was going 
on at the psychological level that had an impact on participants` actions, and consequently 
on their efficiency and supply chain profit, we introduced and moderated a retrospective 
discussion of what was going on during the simulation followed by the structured interview 
of participants.    
Using the previously defined plan of observation of post game discussion with the prepared 
guide for the interviewing participants, with the following questions: What do you expected 
from the partner to do when ordering unexpected amount of goods; What was your reaction 
to the unexpected order;  How do you feel when you were put into a position to deliver 
more goods than you have; How did you feel when you realized that you had too many 
supplies on stock; How did you react/feel when you realized that your profit was less than Economic Interferences  AE 
 
Vol. XV • No. 33 • February 2013  217 
you estimated and your expenses over exceeded your expectances; If you were in a position 
to answer differently, than a professional, on demand from your partner, what would you 
say to him.  
After that, we classified their reactions according to three communicative modes, defined 
by Berne (1964): complementary, crossed and covert transactions. By classifying their 
communication according to the transactional analysis terminology, we wanted to find 
some specific patterns of communication that could be responsible for the loss of trust 
between parties and consequently for the profit reduce.  
We came up with the idea to differentiate two important modes of communication that are 
of specific importance for the good supply chain coordination. We called them productive 
and counterproductive patterns. Productive patterns of communication are defined in 
transactional terms as those transactions that are complementary in their nature providing 
parties with the opportunity to act in coordination, and those that are crossed and provoke 
conflicts, communication disruption and breakages, and are classified as unproductive types 
of communication.   
 
5. Results 
Within every group, teams accomplished similar results comparable with the results MIT 
obtained. 
 
5.1. Cost analysis  
Bullwhip effect occurred in all teams, as we expected. Also, it was found that both teams in 
the group previously acquainted with the beer game achieved better results. Winning team 
from the group whose members were familiar with the beer game phenomenon had overall 
costs (23 weeks) of 1797$ (Table 1, Figure 2), compared with the 2086$ costs of the 
winning team of the other group of “naive” participants (Table 2, Figure 3). Average costs 
(50 weeks) in the MIT case were about $2000, though happened that teams' costs exceed 
$10,000 (Sterman, 1992). 
 
5.2. Analysis of communication  
There are more than few participants to claim that they were feeling frustrated, confused 
and helpless. Forgetting that they were part of the system, focusing only on their share, they 
strived to minimize their own costs. When effects of this strategy arise, players express 
disbelief and often assign blame to each other.  
When students were asked to estimate the real average value of demand, their assessments 
were from 4 to 20 crates per week. Even students in group that was familiar with the 
bullwhip effect, expressed doubt and disbelief regarding the fact that demand varies 
approximately 8 crates, after the fourth week.  Students were not aware of the impact of 
their own actions and decisions on overall system.  AE  Application of Transactional Analysis in Bullwhip Effect Analysis 
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Table no. 1: Costs for participants in a winning team familiar  
with the beer game concept 
   Costs ($)    
weeks retailer  wholesaler  distributor  manufacturer    
1 6  6  6  6     
2 4  4  4  4     
3 4  4  4  4     
4 0  4  4  6     
5 4  6  6  6     
6 6  8  9  10     
7 8  8  10 12     
8 12  15  17 18     
9 15  20  20 23     
10 20  25  27  35     
11 22  26  28  38     
12 25  32  32  20     
13 15  32  35  10     
14 16  33  38  10     
15 10  33  40  20     
16 20  32  40  20     
17 25  34  38  30     
18 24  18  40  35     
19 20  22  33  37     
20 15  20  30  40     
21 10  22  30  35     
22 12  21  28  35     
23 14  22  30  40     
Total costs ($)  1797 
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Figure no. 2: Graphic of costs for participants in a winning team familiar  
with the beer game Economic Interferences  AE 
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Table no. 2: Costs for participants in a winning team with no experience  
with the beer game 
   Costs ($)    
weeks retailer  wholesaler distributor  manufacturer   
1 6  6  6  6     
2 4  4  4  4     
3 4  4  4  4     
4 0  4  4  6     
5 4  6  6  6     
6 6  8  9  10     
7 8  8  10  12     
8 12  15  17  20     
9 15  20  20  23     
10 20  25  30  40     
11 22  27  33  45     
12 25  30  35  47     
13 28  32  37  49     
14 25  35  40  45     
15 20  35  41  50     
16 15  33  40  51     
17 25  34  41  52     
18 25  30  40  48     
19 20  25  35  40     
20 15  20  32  35     
21 17  22  32  33     
22 17  21  30  34     
23 18  22  31  32     
Total costs ($)  2086 
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Figure no. 3: Graphic of costs for participants in a winning team  
with no experience with the beer game 
In general case the participant A influences the participant B to do something that he 
otherwise wouldn`t do. Sometimes the buyer is dominant and dictates the behaviour of the 
manufacturer and supplier, sometimes it is reverse.   AE  Application of Transactional Analysis in Bullwhip Effect Analysis 
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Based on the content of communication of participants in simulated supply chain, we tried 
to apply basic concepts of TA and to help understanding the bullwhip effect. We 
considered two contiguous participants in the chain – supplier and buyer. We observed two 
indicative situations of communication that could represent the appliance of TA on supply 
chain interaction as it is shown at Figures 4 and 5. When, for example (Fig. no 4), a buyer 
from the ego state of "A" orders more than an usual amount of goods (1), the supplier, 
maintaining a professional level of communication, answers: “We are not capable to 
deliver that amount of goods at the moment”(2). However, often with disbelief, the supplier 
gives a convert answer from his "C", delivering a message of a rebellious kind: “What is the 
matter with you to order something I do not have!”(3). Implicitly, he is assigning blame for 
his weakness (disadvantage). This infantile hostile gesture could be followed by a covert 
answer from the ego state of a Criticizing "P", along with the rational, yet charged with 
blame, message: “In that case we have to find the other supplier” (4) implicitly conveying 
the message: “you are not adequate”, that sounds blackmailing and forcing him to prove 
himself.   
            
Figure no. 4: Example of transaction  
in a supply chain functioning simulation 
Figure no. 5: Example of transaction  
in a supply chain functioning simulation 
Supplier could overtly start a sequential transaction from the ego state of a "C" (Fig. no. 5), 
being provoked by the "P" ego state of the buyer, wondering: “You have never before 
bought that amount of supplies”!(1) On this stimulus, sent from the supplier’s "C", the 
buyer could answer from the "P" criticizing his capability to estimate: “You should foresee 
that we would order more”(2), or criticizing his position and possession “it is your 
obligation, responsibility to have enough merchandise on stock”(2). This could lead the 
other part to react from its "C" and to accumulate supplies that end up in bullwhip effect. It 
is a very common scenario because there is a tendency of parties to continue business, and 
that side of less power is advised not to switch communication and to continue with 
complementary pattern of communication.   Economic Interferences  AE 
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These are just examples of a discussion between participants that support the idea that 
analyzing communication in supply chain can give an insight into interaction process 
resulting with bullwhip effect. Due to the interpersonal mechanisms of conveying double 
and crossed messages, according to the transactional analysis conceptual frame, mistrust 
and mentality of parochial interests are spread throughout supply chain. As Dani et al. 
(2004, p.579) point out "TA provides a very valuable tool for displaying the information 
transfer between partners in the supply chain. It can represent the ulterior messages at the 
same time as the psychological message and hence provide a much richer picture about the 
transactions than conventional information modelling tools." Although transactional 
analysis is one of approaches in psychotherapy, managers can easily understand TA 
concepts. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the group that was familiar with the possibility to lose profit as the consequence 
of improper communication, had less expenses than the other group, both suffered from 
bullwhip effect and they both showed a similar patterns of post simulation behaviour. We 
concluded that the theoretical knowledge is not enough for preventing managers from being 
prone to bullwhip effect situation and that they could learn a lot from the simulation of it, 
experiencing the whole spectrum of frustrating experiences and feelings of helplessness. 
So, experiential teaching methodology for future managers could be very useful. Also, the 
experience with bullwhip effect teaches us that it is not an effective strategy to ignore 
human nature and patterns of behaviour when complex business processes are considered. 
As supply chain profit is dependent on good coordination between all parties, there are a lot 
of potentials in analyzing communication within supply chain for building a mutual trust 
and cooperation.  Due to its wide applicability and relative simplicity of its concepts, TA 
could be a useful theoretical framework and methodological tool for achieving 
understanding of supply chain functioning. With the proper knowledge, managers could be 
able to identify, predict and prevent business games (strategies) that jeopardize long-term 
partnership. The motive could be found in the fact that relation between partners has to be 
sustainable in a constantly changing environment. 
This method was qualitative and explorative in its nature. So, our plan for the future 
researches is to introduce moderators into the supply chain simulation who would train 
future managers to communicate in the way to achieve higher profit.  
Also, we realized that our observational plan has one insufficiency concerning the 
importance of including the communicational difference between participants in different 
roles in supply chain (as different patterns of information distortion effects for 
manufacturers and retailers are found: Mishra, Raghunathan, Yue, 2007). The importance 
of different roles is justified by the importance of different power positions in business 
communication process. Perception of power relations has a strong impact on the way we 
conduct interactions and different roles gives by default a different amount of power. Also, 
the power issue could be approached through personal differences that include some 
personality features as the basis for analyzing supply chain decisions. Nevertheless, 
question of power should not be neglected as we have shown in this research by not 
controlling that fact during the analysis of communication. In the future researches AE  Application of Transactional Analysis in Bullwhip Effect Analysis 
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participants could play different roles, i.e. partners which were to blame for the failure, then 
the therapeutic methods of TA would be appropriate. 
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